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Table of Contents

PART ONE: GERMANY

| | Page |
|--|------|
| SECTION I. RECENT TACTICS AND RUSES IN MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN | |
| 1. Introduction | 1 |
| 2. Defensive Methods in Italy | 1 |
| a. <i>In the Mountains North of Venafro</i> | 1 |
| b. <i>In the Monte la Difesa Area</i> | 4 |
| II. CAMOUFLAGE AGAINST AIR OBSERVERS | 8 |
| 1. Introduction | 8 |
| 2. During Movement | 9 |
| 3. In Bivouac | 10 |
| 4. In Combat | 11 |
| 5. Firing Positions (General) | 12 |
| 6. Field Fortifications | 12 |
| 7. Motor Parks and Dumps | 14 |
| 8. Use of Dummies | 15 |
| III. GERMAN PRISONERS DISCUSS THE Pz. Kw. 6 | 18 |
| 1. Introduction | 18 |
| 2. The Comments | 18 |
| IV. PORTABLE FLAME THROWERS | 22 |
| 1. Model 35 | 22 |
| 2. Model 40 | 22 |
| 3. Model 41 | 23 |
| 4. Model 42 | 25 |
| 5. How the Germans Use Them | 27 |
| V. NOTES ON GERMAN VEHICLE MARKINGS | 29 |
| 1. Ignition Switch Positions | 29 |
| 2. Night-driving Switch Positions | 30 |
| 3. Warning Lights | 30 |
| 4. Controls | 30 |
| 5. Tire Pressures | 31 |
| 6. Fillers and Drain Plugs | 31 |
| VI. TRAINING PRINCIPLES OF THE GERMAN ARMY | 32 |
| 1. Introduction | 32 |
| 2. The Organization of Training | 32 |
| 3. The Process of Training | 33 |

TABLE OF CONTENTS

III

PART Two: JAPAN

| SECTION | | Page |
|---------|--|------|
| | I. JAPANESE JUNGLE WARFARE | 37 |
| | 1. Introduction | 37 |
| | 2. General | 37 |
| | a. <i>Training</i> | 38 |
| | b. <i>Disposal of Booby Traps</i> | 39 |
| | c. <i>Equipment</i> | 39 |
| | d. <i>Care of Wounded</i> | 40 |
| | 3. Offense | 40 |
| | a. <i>Movement</i> | 40 |
| | b. <i>Combat Methods</i> | 41 |
| | c. <i>Reaction to Ambush</i> | 45 |
| | d. <i>Special Assault Units</i> | 45 |
| | 4. Defense | 47 |
| | a. <i>Organization of Positions</i> | 47 |
| | b. <i>Plans to Counter U. S. Tactics</i> | 50 |
| | II. NOTES ON DEVELOPMENTS IN JAPANESE DEFENSE | 53 |
| | 1. Introduction | 53 |
| | 2. Organization of Positions | 53 |
| | 3. Defense of Beaches | 56 |
| | a. <i>General</i> | 56 |
| | b. <i>On Kiska</i> | 57 |
| | c. <i>On Bougainville</i> | 60 |
| | 4. Defense against Tanks | 60 |
| | III. TWO BOOBY TRAPS DEVISED BY JAPANESE | 63 |
| | 1. Introduction | 63 |
| | 2. Details of Tube Type | 64 |
| | a. <i>Construction</i> | 64 |
| | b. <i>Operation</i> | 64 |
| | c. <i>Ways of Rigging</i> | 64 |
| | 3. Details of String Type | 67 |
| | IV. JAPANESE CHARACTERISTICS AND REACTION IN BATTLE | 69 |
| | 1. Introduction | 69 |
| | 2. As Seen by Observers | 70 |
| | 3. According to Japanese Sources | 72 |
| | V. JAPANESE PLAN TO COUNTER SUPERIOR FIRE POWER | 75 |
| | 1. Introduction | 75 |
| | 2. The Plan | 75 |
| | a. <i>Preparations</i> | 75 |
| | b. <i>Use of Weapons</i> | 76 |

| | Page |
|---|------|
| VI. SOME JAPANESE METHODS OF OVERCOMING OBSTACLES. | 77 |
| 1. Introduction----- | 77 |
| 2. Wire Obstacles----- | 77 |
| a. <i>Operating with Secrecy</i> ----- | 78 |
| b. <i>Operating under Fire</i> ----- | 79 |
| 3. Abatis----- | 80 |
| 4. Antitank Obstacles----- | 80 |
| VII. MISCELLANEOUS----- | 82 |
| 1. Handling Prisoners----- | 82 |
| 2. Use of Engineers----- | 82 |

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

| | |
|--|----|
| FIGURE 1. German Dummy Tank----- | 16 |
| FIGURE 2. German Portable Flame Thrower, Model 41----- | 24 |
| FIGURE 3. German Portable Flame Thrower, Model 42----- | 26 |
| FIGURE 4. Japanese Squad Position (defense)----- | 48 |
| FIGURE 5. Typical Japanese Rifle Pit (Makin)----- | 55 |
| FIGURE 6. Typical Japanese Machine-gun Position (Makin)----- | 56 |
| FIGURE 7. Japanese Antitank-gun Emplacement (Makin)----- | 57 |
| FIGURE 8. Japanese Tube Booby Trap----- | 65 |
| FIGURE 9. Japanese Tube Booby Trap (utilizing spring method)----- | 66 |
| FIGURE 10. Japanese Tube Booby Trap (utilizing weight method)----- | 67 |
| FIGURE 11. Japanese Tube Booby Trap (utilizing elastic stake method)----- | 68 |
| FIGURE 12. Japanese String Booby Trap----- | 68 |

PART ONE: GERMANY

Section I. RECENT TACTICS AND RUSES IN MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN

1. INTRODUCTION

The Germans have been showing decided originality in exploiting rugged, rocky terrain in Italy. Since terrain of this type is common to many parts of Southern Europe, and is very likely to favor the defenders, certain enemy defensive methods employed under such conditions are examined here.

2. DEFENSIVE METHODS IN ITALY

a. In the Mountains North of Venafro

From a river valley 600 feet above sea level at Pozzilli, the mountains rise to an elevation of 2,300 feet, 3,000 yards north of the town, and to an elevation of 2,115 feet, 2,000 yards west of the town. Between these masses are ravines and terraced slopes. The mountains, or high hills, are crisscrossed with rock walls, and there are small olive groves here and there. The rock walls protect Roman trails, roughly paved with

stone, which traverse each cultivated section and link farms and villages. Apart from the rock walls and olive trees, there are only barren slopes.

The Germans attempted to deny United Nations forces access to the hills and to the valley entrances beyond Pozzilli. It was the enemy intention to make it necessary for opposing troops to expose themselves by moving across open slopes or to be canalized in ravines.

Most of the German automatic weapons were forward. The riflemen were behind them, removed from direct fire and ready to counterattack. Weapons were grouped, and each section was protected by bunkers and provided with prepared shelters.

The German shelters in this area consisted of dug-outs reinforced with rocks, boards, and earth. The rock covering was sufficiently well extended along the front and sides to blend with the rocky terrain and thereby provided excellent camouflage. These shelters were large enough to accommodate from two to five men. Whereas the smaller shelters merely had straw for bedding, the interiors of the larger and more elaborate positions were revetted with boards and contained bunks. Some of the dugouts were strong enough to withstand direct mortar and light artillery fire.

Gun positions were situated near the shelters. There was nothing strikingly unusual about the emplacements. Some had a small amount of overhead cover. All automatic weapons were protected by a few rifle-

men, who also acted as observers and as sentries along the trails.

German weapons were sited so as to cover the exposed slopes of hills with interlocking bands of fire, to cover hollows between hills with cross fire, and to place direct fire down each trail, ravine, or gully. In addition to having a primary fire mission, each position was so situated as to cover an adjacent position and to support its fire. The network of rock walls protecting the Roman trails enabled the defenders to move troops, shift the zones of action, and, in general, to conceal many kinds of activity from hostile observation. Protected by these walls, German riflemen continually harassed the attackers with machine-pistol fire and hand grenades.

It required very close observation to detect the exact location of German weapons and their fields of fire.

German camouflage discipline was excellent, and in forward areas there was a decided lack of visible movement by daylight. The simplicity of the German positions resulted in such an effective blend with the rocky terrain that they presented a remarkably natural appearance, even to air observation.

The German riflemen who had been withheld for use in counterattacks were employed for that purpose throughout the operations. At no time, however, was a counterattack made in greater strength than that needed to regain a very limited objective. Because of the rock walls shielding the trails, it was very dif-

ficult to be sure of the German point of main effort (*Schwerpunkt*) until after an attack had developed.

One night counterattack in particular is of interest, involving, as it did, an unusual ruse. Two or three Germans armed with machine pistols drove a herd of goats into the right flank of a battalion position. Under cover of the resulting noise and confusion, the main German effort was launched against the left flank of the same battalion position. At first, the ruse was successful. The counterattack was repulsed only after a bitter hand-to-hand fight.

Throughout the German defense of the Pozzilli area, German artillery placed intermittent harassing fire on zones not completely covered by small-arms fire. Evidence suggests that this harassing fire was not observed, but, rather, that it was prearranged and that the Germans had secured their firing data before United Nations troops attacked. The Germans laid down only one heavy barrage during the entire action.

b. In the Monte la Difesa Area

(1) In the Monte la Difesa area (which is about 8 miles southwest of Venafro), an unusually high percentage of German infantry was found to be armed with machine pistols. The enemy also used the MG 42. Both the machine pistol and the MG 42 have a very high cyclic rate of fire, which permits easy distinction between German and friendly automatic weapons. Many rifles equipped with flash hiders were employed.

(2) An unusual German method of mortar and artillery fire control was encountered in this area, where the terrain is rugged and rocky, with a number of natural caves and clefts in the mountainside. The Germans improved these clefts and used them as dugouts, camouflaging each opening so that it blended with the terrain and constructing a protective barrier across the front. In some instances, dugouts were occupied by only one man, who was supplied with enough ammunition, rations, and water for several days. The occupant was armed with a machine pistol, and was supplied with tracer ammunition. As the attack progressed toward the German position, the supporting troops withdrew, but the occupant of the shelter remained in place. When he observed a promising mortar or artillery target, he fired a round of machine-pistol tracer at, or over, the target. Usually this procedure was undertaken by two of the posts; as a result, the target was indicated by the intersection of tracer fire. This tracer fire served both as the call for mortar and artillery fire and as the control.

The observers kept their positions secret as long as they possibly could, firing only an occasional round for effect and never engaging targets for their own personal defense, except as a last resort.

Some of these observation posts were provided with escape routes, while others permitted no easy exit. In the latter case, the observer would remain at his post until he was killed or captured. It is significant

that at least one of the dugouts was equipped with radio.

(3) The Germans had mortar and artillery firing data covering existing trails, but these calculations were upset when the attackers used new trails up the mountains. The enemy made a special effort to place fire on United Nations soldiers who bunched up. Enemy observers did not call for artillery or mortar fire on two or three men, but when they observed a dozen or more soldiers close together, they called for fire to be placed on them immediately.

(4) The enemy used ruses to locate United Nations positions. Sometimes German soldiers would deliberately expose themselves by needless movement, with the obvious intention of drawing fire. If United Nations soldiers revealed their position by firing, they themselves promptly received mortar fire. On the other hand, the Germans were susceptible to trickery, and on one occasion even fell for the old ruse of a helmet on a stick.

(5) The Germans tried to avoid combat at night. This generally has been the case throughout the Italian campaign. The enemy usually depended on mortar and artillery fire to halt night attacks, and tended to become confused when such attacks were pressed.

(6) The Germans employed the "white flag" ruse several times. On the first occasion, enemy soldiers in covered positions fired on a United Nations junior officer who went forward to accept a prisoner advancing under a white flag. After that, whenever the

ruse was attempted by the Germans, it failed when the attackers themselves remained motionless and ordered the bearers of white flags to keep moving forward.

(7) A controlled minefield was encountered in the Monte la Difensa area. Tellermines were rigged with pull-devices, with wire leading to the German positions. In this way the enemy could detonate a mine when United Nations troops approached, even though there was no physical contact between the attackers and the device.

(8) A German prisoner stated that his company was divided into two platoons, one of which worked as snipers while the other served as a combat patrol. Although no enemy patrols were encountered, it is quite probable that they existed; if they actually operated, it is likely that they were so dispersed and had to cover such a large area that they stopped functioning as units and worked as individual observers. The rugged terrain may well have been responsible for this.

Section II. CAMOUFLAGE AGAINST AIR OBSERVERS

1. INTRODUCTION

This section complements "Camouflage Against Ground Observers," an article which appeared in a previous issue of the *Intelligence Bulletin* (Vol. II, No. 5, pp. 25-32). As that article pointed out, a single camouflage undertaking may deceive both air and ground observers with equal success. However, although the Germans believe that camouflage against United Nations air observation is the primary consideration, they stipulate that at the front it must be closely tied in with camouflage against ground observers. In connection with the following German precautions against hostile air reconnaissance, it should be noted that German camouflage activity and discipline in Italy has thus far been notably good. The commander of any German unit, however small, is supposed to be capable of developing a successful camouflage scheme, using whatever materials he can find locally. The Germans leave much to the individual, who generally is expected to improvise his own camouflage devices. Aside from sniper suits and snow

suits, little except ungarnished nets, helmet nets, and occasionally paint is issued to the individual soldier.

2. DURING MOVEMENT

a. Although every effort is made to undertake general troop movements only at night or under conditions affording bad visibility, elaborate camouflage measures are observed when daytime movement is ordered for tactical or technical reasons. These measures are maintained through the night as well, for greater security. Units are brought in small numbers from camouflaged assembly areas to the point from which they are to move. No delay is permitted. In movement by rail, canvas-covered frames are erected on flat cars carrying guns, tanks, and so on, to duplicate the appearance of box cars. When movement is conducted on roads, halts and rests are timed with due consideration for making the most of natural cover. Motorized units often go some little distance in search of woods or orchards. If no natural cover is available, efforts are made to fit in with the natural pattern of the terrain, as seen from the air.

b. A night ruse prescribed by the German Army involves the spacing of partly dimmed lights at regular intervals along a road, to draw the attention of hostile night reconnaissance away from an actual German column which is moving in complete darkness.

c. To avoid conspicuous crowding at bridges, narrow passes, and so on, vehicles are stationed in ready-

ness under the nearest cover, and then are sent through one by one or in small groups.

d. In order to deceive as to the exact places where river crossings are to be made, "false crossings" are initiated at other places either before or during actual crossings. A certain amount of actual bridging material, smoke, and sound effects is employed to make the ruse all the more convincing.

e. As part of track discipline, vehicles are prohibited from taking short cuts, and individuals are forbidden to shape fresh footpaths, in the vicinity of any area where movement is to halt and where a camouflage plan is to go into effect.

Emergency roads and paths follow close to ditches, the edges of fields, the banks of lakes, rivers, or creeks, and the edges of gullies.

3. IN BIVOUAC

a. In towns the Germans make a great effort to park guns, tanks, and vehicles under cover. When this is impossible, irregular dispersion is carried out in courtyards and gardens, beside walls and hedges, and under trees. Tents are similarly screened. Artificial camouflage material is used to improve weak points.

The Germans make good use of the camouflage opportunities presented by destroyed or burnt-out villages. Personnel, vehicles, weapons, and supplies are concealed in the ruins with great care so that very little artificial camouflage need be added.

b. Outside towns and villages, bivouacs are situated as far as possible in woods having thick foliage. Tree tops are bound together, and roofs of foliage are constructed, to conceal open patches.

c. In open country, bivouac tents are pitched in valleys, ditches, gullies, quarries, as well as under overhanging rocks, and beside any fairly high natural growth that can be found. If natural cover is totally lacking, tents are pitched far apart and irregularly, and vehicles are dug-in and camouflaged.

The Germans make a great point of not allowing equipment to remain in plain view. Similarly, all such items as empty tin cans, discarded bits of paper, and other waste are carefully kept out of sight.

4. IN COMBAT

In combat, responsibility for maintaining camouflage discipline rests almost entirely in the hands of the individual German soldier, who is very good at utilizing shadows, woods, ditches, scrub growth, gardens, and field crops for concealment. He uses local vegetation to camouflage his person, and is expert at advancing by crawling. Reports from Italy emphasize the ability of the German soldier to lie quietly in one spot for hours at a time, and then methodically to resume his mission.

5. FIRING POSITIONS (GENERAL)

a. To avoid creating new tracks, the Germans try to establish firing positions near roads. Existing opportunities for concealment are taken into account; thus the Germans make the most of buildings, courtyards, places damaged by fire, woods, and individual trees. In Italy the olive trees have proved especially useful for this. In open country, slopes, valleys, and gullies are favored. Abandoned infantry positions are sometimes used. When no cover is available, weapons are dug in and are camouflaged with garnished nets.

To preserve the total effect of a camouflage plan, the Germans have been known to withhold all fire when there has been a possibility of reconnaissance by hostile aircraft—but observance of this precaution has generally depended on how much the Germans have had at stake in the ground situation.

6. FIELD FORTIFICATIONS

a. The Germans make every effort to study air photographs of the terrain before devising a camouflage scheme of any appreciable size. The resulting over-all plan includes the following precautions: warnings regarding all places especially vulnerable to air and ground observation, selection of good positions for which natural local cover is already available, allotment of artificial camouflage material to positions where it can be used to advantage, disposition of

dummy positions, and decisions regarding control of movement. Whenever possible, the Germans take air photographs at progressive stages of the work, to make sure that the terrain pattern is not undergoing any change—or, if it is, to make sure that its former appearance can be restored.

b. Trenches are covered, wherever possible. The Germans use various methods. For example, they garnish wire-covered frames with scrub growth, straw, and so on, to blend with the terrain, and lift them during an attack, to permit observation and fire. Similarly, they bind branches and straw together with wire or string, place them across the trenches—with openings provided for observation and fire—and secure these mats to the ground by stakes at regularly spaced intervals, to prevent sagging. To allow light to enter a covered trench, the Germans sometimes leave openings every 8 or 10 yards, which they cover with translucent cloth, such as gauze, suitably colored.

c. The Germans maintain that complete camouflage of concrete emplacements is as much of a safety measure as the concrete itself, although in a different sense. The possibility of fitting such defenses into existing terrain cover is always considered at the outset. Excavations fit into irregular terrain patterns, and straight lines and edges are avoided. Entrances are kept as small as possible. When it is essential for the emplacement to project above ground level, the walls are covered with a mixture of tar and asphalt, with earth or straw stuck to it. The enemy frequently

camouflages the roofs with turf in which natural vegetation is growing.

German pillboxes on the edges of villages are usually camouflaged as houses and sheds, and in open country as farm cottages and outbuildings. This is relatively easy in Southern Europe, because of the widespread use of whitewashed terra cotta for civilian buildings.

d. The Germans remove excavated earth at night or in bad weather. It is either removed a considerable distance, or is used in the construction of dummy emplacements. (See paragraph 8.) If it is left near the site, it is made to conform with the ground pattern.

e. Wherever possible, wire obstacles are erected on covered ground, but if they are erected in exposed areas, the Germans often take the precaution of painting wooden stakes to match the terrain or of smearing the tops with earth.

Minefields, too, are laid with an eye to possible air observation. True minefields are planned so as to disturb the terrain pattern as little as possible, whereas dummy minefields are left sufficiently exposed to permit detection.

7. MOTOR PARKS AND DUMPS

It is a German policy to establish motor parks and food and ammunition dumps in woods whenever it is possible to do so. The Germans recommend that these be established about 100 yards from the edge of the north side of the woods if circumstances permit.

Trees are felled only when necessary. Even in thick woods, dumps are camouflaged with undergrowth.

In occupied localities dumps are kept under cover. A favorite ruse is to situate them in courtyards and to disguise them as woodpiles. In open country, groves of trees, clumps of bushes, and overhanging ledges are widely utilized. The Germans do not permit a concentration of vehicles to stand in the vicinity of a dump in the daytime; instead, the vehicles are grouped under cover, and proceed singly to the dump.

8. USE OF DUMMIES

a. The Germans attempt to devise dummy constructions which will divert the opposition's attention and upset its fire plan. They are erected at the same time as actual installations, and are given an almost convincing camouflage treatment. The Germans do not place them at random, but, rather, make them appear to have been erected for tactical purposes. They are situated far enough away from genuine installations so that fire directed against the former will not harm the latter. Dummies are maintained, and are visited from time to time, to add to the illusion that they are in use.

b. Whenever possible, a dummy position is so planned that any ground attack against it can be counterattacked on the flank from a genuine position. Dummy trenches are usually of normal width, but are only a few inches deep. Sometimes the Germans

burn straw in them to blacken the interior and make them more convincing when seen from the air.

c. Dummy dugouts are generally suggested by nothing more than an entrance.

d. Dummy paths leading to dummy positions are prepared. In fields the grass is mown down the width of the path to leave a flat surface for texture contrast. In bare country, paint or natural materials are sometimes used to give paths the light color of a flat surface.

e. The Germans regard dummy figures as useful in completing the illusion of dummy machine-gun positions.

f. Dummies are used to suggest the presence of tanks in an area. As a rule, the construction of these is very simple (see fig. 1), but sufficiently appropriate positions are chosen to heighten the reality.




Figure 1.—German Dummy Tank.

g. The Germans simulate minefields merely by digging up sod and replacing it unnaturally. (There are usually a few true mines in the enemy's dummy minefields. A proportion of 5 to 10 percent is not uncommon.) For added effect, wire and warning notices are often erected.

h. Dummy lights, suitably placed, are used to suggest railroad stations, factories, and airdromes. Partly dimmed lanterns are stretched across open country to suggest the presence of troop columns, and dummy bivouac areas are represented by camp fires.

i. The Germans have been known to cover dummy positions with smoke screens. The purpose of this is not only to deceive air observers, but to draw fire and thus determine hostile gun positions.

Section III. GERMAN PRISONERS DISCUSS THE Pz. Kw. 6

1. INTRODUCTION

In discussing the employment of the Pz. Kw. 6, or "Tiger" tank, two well-informed German noncommissioned officers recently made a number of statements which should be of interest and value to readers of the *Intelligence Bulletin*. Although the material contained in this section has been evaluated as substantially correct and in line with information already known to the Military Intelligence Division, it must be treated with a certain degree of reserve, as is customary with material obtained from prisoner-of-war sources. This, however, does not alter the fact that it can be studied with profit.

2. THE COMMENTS

a. After Pz. Kw. 6's have had to move long distances, and before they can then go into action, a number of adjustments must be made. For example, bogie wheels must be changed. It is therefore unlikely that the tanks will often be sent directly into action after a long approach march on tracks.

b. Originally, it was planned that Pz. Kw. 6's should be supported by an equal number of Pz. Kw.

3's to provide local protection. The latter would move on the flanks of the main body of the Pz. Kw. 6's and cover them against hostile tank hunters attempting to attack them at close range. During an assault, the Pz. Kw. 6's would attack hostile heavy tank battalions or heavy pillboxes, and the Pz. Kw. 3's would attack machine-gun nests or lighter tanks. This method was altered in Sicily, where ground conditions repeatedly kept tanks to the roads and limited their usefulness—thereby decreasing the need for local protection. At least one battalion, which should have had nine of each type to a company, exchanged its Pz. Kw. 3's for the Pz. Kw. 6's of another unit, after which the company was made up of 17 Pz. Kw. 6's only.

c. A prisoner of war stated that on one occasion his turret jammed in turning, making it impossible for the crew to blow up their tank by means of a built-in explosive charge which was situated under one of the plates (possibly forward of the turret) in such a way that it could be reached only when the turret was directly facing the rear.

d. These prisoners remarked that in a "model" attack by a Tiger battalion, the standard company formation is a wedge or an arrowhead, with one platoon forward. This platoon is generally led by an officer, whose tank moves in the center of the formation. The company commander is forward, but not necessarily in the lead. The battalion commander is not forward, as a rule. It must be remembered, how-

ever, that the "model" attack cannot take into account such factors as variable terrain and the strength of the opposition. Therefore, deviations from the "model" formation are not only sanctioned, but are actually common.

The prisoners appeared to consider frontal attacks no less usual than outflanking attacks.

e. A prisoner stated that his Pz. Kw. 6 carried over 100 shells for the gun, "stowed everywhere"; however, the standard ammunition load is 92 shells. According to him, although the 88-mm gun in the Pz. Kw. 6 can fire up to 10,000 to 12,000 yards indirect, this type of firing is very difficult and is seldom undertaken. He declared that the best range is 1,000 to 2,000 yards—"the nearer the better."

f. Although one prisoner of war stated that the Pz. Kw. 6 carries a gyroscopic compass, he maintained that it is impossible to attack at night because of vision difficulties. Theoretically, however, the gyroscopic compass is very good for keeping direction by night and in smoke or fog.

g. According to a prisoner, the chain of wireless communication is from battalion to company to platoon. The latter link is a frequency on which all the tanks in the company are tuned, but each platoon and headquarters has a code name by which it is called up. For special operations—for example, long-range reconnaissance patrols—tanks can be netted by a frequency other than the company frequency. However, this entails altering the sets. Alternatively,

tanks can be given two sets tuned to two frequencies, but this is seldom done except in the case of the company headquarters tank, where it is the normal procedure. All priority and battle messages are passed in the clear, but important tactical terms (such as "attack," "outflank," "assemble") have code names (such as "dance," "sing," and so on). Each tank carries a list of these code names.

In Russia, where German troops often were 4 miles or so from headquarters, Soviet troops made a practice of intercepting traffic between battalion and company, so that they would have enough time to take preparatory measures before company orders came through.

h. The Germans take great pains to camouflage their Pz. Kw. 6's, a prisoner remarked. Every effort was made by one particular battalion to make their tanks look like the 3-ton personnel carrier. A dummy radiator and front wheels were fitted to the front of the tank, the top of the radiator being about level with the top of the tank's hull. A thin sheet metal body was fitted over the entire tank. This metal body was supported by a metal projection fitted to the top of the turret, and was not in contact with the hull of the tank at any point. The gun projected through a hole. Apparently the camouflage body was rotated by the turret, and did not have to be removed when the gun was traversed. This rather elaborate form of camouflage exceeded the dimensions of the 3-ton personnel carrier by at least 3 to 6 feet.

Section IV. PORTABLE FLAME THROWERS

Since the beginning of the war, the German portable flame thrower has undergone a number of modifications. Each successive model has represented an attempt to provide a less cumbersome weapon without decreasing its effective range. The various models are discussed in the following paragraphs.

1. MODEL 35

The German portable flame thrower, Model 35, which was in use at the start of the present war, is a modified version of the 1918 German flame thrower. The fuel container is a commercial-type pressure cylinder which also holds the compressed nitrogen used to propel the jet of fuel. Fuel ejection and ignition are controlled by a trigger lever on top of the flame gun. This weapon weighs 79 pounds. It has a fuel capacity of 2.6 gallons and a flame range of 25 yards.

2. MODEL 40

This so-called "Lifebuoy Type" portable flame thrower has a fuel unit consisting of two concentric

ring-shaped containers, which are carried flat on the operator's back. The total weight of this flame thrower is 47 pounds. Its fuel capacity is only 1.5 gallons. The flame range is approximately the same as that of the Model 35.

3. MODEL 41

The German portable flame thrower, Model 41, introduced about August 1942, and its later modification, the portable flame thrower, Model 42, are equipped with flame guns of two different types. The rest of the equipment is the same for both models and can be used with either type of flame gun.

Figure 2 illustrates the Model 41, and figure 3 illustrates the Model 42.

Fuel capacity, weight, and flame range of the two most recent models do not differ much from those of the Model 40. The following table supplies basic information.

| | <i>Model 41</i> | <i>Model 42</i> |
|----------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Maximum range----- | 25 yd | 25 yd |
| Total weight, charged----- | approx 47 lb | 40½ lb |
| Total weight, empty----- | 32.2 lb | 29 lb |
| Fuel capacity----- | 1½ gal | 1½ gal |
| Fuel pressure----- | 368 lb/sq in | 368 lb/sq in |
| Nitrogen capacity----- | 218 cu in | 218 cu in |
| Hydrogen capacity----- | 28½ cu in | ----- |

The flame gun of the Model 41 is the same as that used in the earlier types of German portable flame throwers. The jet of fuel is ignited by a hydrogen

flame, which itself is ignited by a battery-actuated electric device. The hydrogen cylinder, 16 inches long and 1½ inches in diameter, is mounted on the flame gun. The rubber fuel hose, which has an inside diameter of approximately 1 inch, is wire-braided on the outside. The fuel tank and the pressure cylinder,




Figure 2.

each charged with compressed nitrogen, are 13 inches long, their diameters being 7 inches and 5 inches, respectively. Both containers are carried on the operator's back, in a horizontal position and with the pressure cylinder placed above the fuel tank. The fuel valve, which controls the flow of fuel to the flame gun, is so placed that the operator can rotate the hand wheel with his left hand.

The tank carrier consists of a fabric-covered quadrangular frame, fitted with two metal cradles. Each cradle consists of a horizontal bar with a semicircular metal strip at each end. The fuel tank and the pressure cylinder are held on the cradles by a metal band fitted with a quick-release clasp and cotter pin. The tank carrier is provided with two shoulder straps.

4. MODEL 42

Except for the flame gun, this equipment is the same as the Model 41. Although shorter, the flame gun of the Model 42 is otherwise similar in appearance to that of the Model 41. The essential difference between the two models is in the ignition method. In the Model 42 flame gun, the fuel jet is ignited by the flash from a blank cartridge, instead of by a hydrogen flame.

The principal parts of the flame gun are a fuel tube with a fuel-discharge valve at the rear, an ignition device, and a removable protective cover for the ignition.

The fuel-discharge valve is controlled by a trigger lever, which can be folded flat when not in use.

The protective dust cover is a steel tube, $1\frac{1}{2}$ inches in diameter, and constitutes the forward outside part of the flame gun. Removal of this cover discloses the ignition device. This consists essentially of a tubular spring-loaded cartridge magazine, mounted above, and parallel with, the fuel tube. The breech and the firing and cartridge-ejection mechanisms are at the forward

GERMAN PORTABLE
FLAME THROWER
MODEL 42




Figure 3.

end. The magazine holds 10 blank 9-mm (0.35-inch) rimless cartridges.

The normal position of the breech is such that the mouth of the cartridge is about 0.4 inch from the fuel jet and inclines at an angle to it, so that the flash is directed into the fuel jet.

The firing mechanism is operated by the same trigger lever that controls the fuel-discharge valve. When this trigger is moved to the rear, the fuel discharge valve begins to open. At the same time, the breech of the firing mechanism swings back into line with the magazine. Ejection of the spent cartridge takes place, a fresh cartridge is inserted by spring pressure, and the striker pin is withdrawn, thereby allowing the breech to swing forward into an inclined position. Percussion takes place with the fuel valve wide open. When the trigger is released, the fuel-discharge valve closes, and the firing mechanism is again ready.

The Model 42 flame gun weighs 5½ pounds, or about 2½ pounds less than the Model 41. It is cleverly designed, but is very complex and requires a number of expensive small parts.

5. HOW THE GERMANS USE THEM

Only the engineers carry and employ flame throwers. However, the engineers in the German Army are regarded as combat troops, and engineer elements are frequently attached to small infantry

units, down to the smallest assault detachments. These elements may be anything from an engineer platoon attached to an advance guard¹ to two engineers with a flame thrower supporting a raiding party.

Flame throwers are used only against static targets, preferably in inclosed spaces. They are used most of all against pillboxes. In such instances the flame-throwing detachment begins the final assault on the pillbox itself by engaging the embrasures at close range after infantry detachments have cut any communication wire. (The flame throwers usually advance to within effective range under cover of smoke or of fire from machine guns, antitank guns, or single tanks.)

The effect of the flame thrower is chiefly psychological. Moreover, the men carrying the equipment are good targets, once they have been spotted. Experience has shown that casualties in German flame-thrower detachments are high.

¹ Although the German tables of organization represent such a platoon as consisting of 60 men with 2 flame throwers, it should be noted that for special missions the number of flame throwers may be increased.

Section V. NOTES ON GERMAN VEHICLE MARKINGS

On the instrument panels and other parts of captured vehicles, there are various words and phrases which are very likely to puzzle the U. S. soldier. In translation, however, they will make sense to almost anyone who has been accustomed to driving U. S. vehicles.

1. IGNITION SWITCH POSITIONS

0—All off except windshield wiper and inspection light.

1—Parking lights on.

2—Headlights and parking lights on.

When the ignition key is withdrawn, only the above are available.

When the ignition key is inserted, the ignition is switched on, the horn and the turn indicator arm will work, and also the lights as above.

2. NIGHT-DRIVING SWITCH POSITIONS

O—Night-driving equipment turned off.

H—Screened headlight off; only the distance (convoy) rear light on.

V1—Rear blackout light on, screened headlight weak.

V2—Rear blackout light on, screened headlight medium.

V3—Rear blackout light on, screened headlight bright.

3. WARNING LIGHTS

The ignition light shows red when the ignition is on but the battery is not charging.

The oil pressure warning light shows green until the oil pressure is normal.

When the headlight main beam is "bright," a capital "F" (*Fern*) is lighted on blue glass.

4. CONTROLS

The control marked "START" is not that of the starter, but of the starter device in the carburetor.

The control marked "ANLASSER" is the self-starter button.

The control marked "GAS" is the accelerator lever.

The control marked "SPAR" is a hand-accelerator control.

The control marked "A" (*Auf*) means that the gasoline flow is turned on; "Z" (*Zu*) means that the gasoline flow is turned off; "R" (RESERVE) means reserve gasoline.

The radiator (KÜHLER) shutter control marked "AUF" means open; "ZU" means closed.

The pedal marked "K" or "KUPPLUNG" is the clutch.

The pedal marked "B" or "BREMSE" is the brake.

The gear-lever positions are marked I, II, III, IV, and so on; "R" or "RÜCKWÄRTS" means reverse; "G" or "GELÄNDE" means cross-country underdrive (for further gear reduction).

The auxiliary gear-lever marked "STR" or "STRASSE" indicates the normal drive (rear wheels only); "G" or "GEL" indicates the front-wheel drive; "SW" or "SPILL" engages the winch.

5. TIRE PRESSURES

Tire pressures are written on the fenders in white.

The figure given should be multiplied by 15 to get the tire pressure in pounds.

6. FILLERS AND DRAIN PLUGS

For grease—red.

For water—white.

For brake-oil—yellow.

Section VI. TRAINING PRINCIPLES OF THE GERMAN ARMY

1. INTRODUCTION

The following extracts from a German Army field manual on military education and training afford insight into the German military mind and character. The principles contained in this manual play an important part in the development of the enemy soldier. Parts of the manual, together with a document entitled "An Introduction to Military Leadership," were recently combined into a single booklet by the commanding officer of the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division, who ordered that it be distributed to all the officers of his command. It may be recalled that some of the notes on military leadership appeared in *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 7, pp. 52-56. The training principles which follow should serve to give U. S. junior officers and enlisted men a much clearer understanding of the German soldier's military background.

2. THE ORGANIZATION OF TRAINING

- a. Aside from experience gained in previous wars, training programs in the German Army are determined only by the re-

quirements of this present war. Theoretical peacetime experiences are always misleading.

b. The goal of training is absolute knowledge of essential subject matter. The result of such training should be the ability of the student to apply, on his own initiative, the knowledge he has been taught.

Instruction does not cease when a number of manual skills have been drilled to mechanical perfection, but finds its end in stimulating a true understanding of the nature and purpose of the subject learned.

c. Every commander is responsible for training the unit entrusted to him, but the company commander's responsibility is the greatest of all. His work creates the basis for the preparedness and striking power of the German Army. It is the duty of all superior officers to support him in his difficult task without limiting his field of action.

d. Planned organization of training is necessary for an efficient exploitation of the short time allotted. Every hour is precious.

Training always advances from easy to difficult tasks, from work of the individual soldier to the combined effort of units.

In the training of individual men, squads, and small units, an understanding of the cooperation of all arms must be created and fostered as early as possible.

e. The basic and advanced training of commissioned and non-commissioned officers must run parallel to individual and group training.

3. THE PROCESS OF TRAINING

a. It is more essential that a German soldier be thorough than that he be versatile. Commanders and subordinates alike must remember that exactness in the performance of all duties is a most important requirement. Monotony, however, is harmful.

b. The basis for all training with weapons is physical hardening. It is provided by gymnastics, which steel the body, promote agility and endurance, increase speed of coordination, and make a soldier adaptable to sudden changes in the course of events.

c. Drill accustoms the individual to formations which are indispensable to the proper appearance of an outfit. It teaches orderliness and military bearing, and, if used correctly, increases the self-confidence of the troops. Nevertheless, drill should take up only a limited amount of time.

d. Weapons training conveys to the soldier the knowledge and skill that he requires to put his weapons and equipment to the most effective use.

e. Combat training is the most important phase of the whole training program. It should mold the soldier into a determined fighter capable of acting with initiative in behalf of his unit. The purpose of combat exercises is to give the soldier a lasting impression of the proper movements on a battlefield, and the correct use of his weapons in combat.

f. Subjects to be taught and applied in practical exercises must first be prepared and impressed on the minds of the students in the classroom. An instructor must be thoroughly familiar with his subject before he attempts to teach it.

g. In unit training it must always be kept in mind that our paramount aim is to force our will upon the enemy.

Special training is required for flexibility of command, mobility and speed of units, surprise and deception, exploitation of darkness or terrain features, and skillful camouflage.

h. Although troops must at all times understand the principle of coordination of all arms, the training schedule embodying the actual practice of this principle should develop progressively, beginning with the training of the smallest units and ending with the training of the largest units.

Careful preparations for each problem must be made. An exact understanding of its purpose and a careful application

of past experiences are more valuable than too frequent and too long-drawn-out problems.

i. In unit maneuvers the success of the problems depends largely on the simplicity of the situation, the clarity of the combat orders, and the maximum approximation of actual combat conditions.

j. Carefully planned and prudent organization of a unit's noncommissioned officers, and careful training and education of these men, decisively influences the unit's appearance and performance. One of the main duties of the company commander is the constant improvement of his noncommissioned officers.

k. The aim of noncommissioned-officer training is the development of independent, efficient leaders for small units, and of men who will prove good, self-reliant trainers in their own right.

The development of leadership qualities, intensification of general and special knowledge, and supervision of instruction are of the utmost importance. The self-assurance of noncommissioned officers and their conduct as leaders will be greatly improved if they are called out in front of their units and entrusted with missions which entail responsibility. The granting of enough freedom of action for the execution of such missions aids in preserving, in the long run, a soldier's alert and cheerful view of his responsibility to the military establishment.

l. Although an officer's training as a leader, educator, and trainer is in the hands of his commander, every officer must work continuously on his own development.

An officer's career can be a success only if he succeeds in stimulating in others his keen and cheerful conception of duty, and if he continuously succeeds in enlisting cooperation.

The only really successful type of training is that which is not content with mere criticism, but which conveys practical knowledge by means of explicit instruction and concrete guidance.

m. The training of officer replacements is one of the most exacting, and at the same time one of the most rewarding, duties of the commanders responsible for them.

The course of training through which an officer candidate must pass, and the impressions which will remain in his mind, determine his entire career. Only those who know from their own experiences what the life and service of the enlisted man is like, and who themselves have learned to obey, can become acceptable commanders.

n. Almost all further training of the young officer takes place while he is actually serving with his unit. Under the supervision of his company or battery commander, he must perfect himself in his handling of formations, in his ability to treat his subordinates appropriately, and in his efficiency in carrying out his regular duties.

o. In his future training, careful preparation for service with higher echelons and with special branches of the service is added to the ever-continuing process of training that he undergoes.

Tactical problems, planning exercises, and other work which permits originality will greatly enlarge his talent for leadership and his understanding of logistics.

The longer he serves in the German Army, the better qualified he should be to evaluate character, and the more widely he should expand his military and general education.

p. The actual quality of a unit is determined by the over-all picture of its state of training. It is more important for all soldiers in one line of training to receive an equal and well-balanced amount than for a few individuals to perform certain record achievements.

PART TWO: JAPAN

Section I. JAPANESE JUNGLE WARFARE

1. INTRODUCTION

The following information on Japanese jungle warfare is largely based on enemy sources, all of which are believed reliable. Most of the information was disseminated by the enemy after he had suffered numerous reverses in the Southwest Pacific, and therefore should include some of the latest tactics he has devised for jungle combat.

This discussion of Japanese jungle warfare is not intended as a complete study of enemy tactical doctrine on the subject. It deals largely with information which has not previously been widely disseminated among U. S. troops. For a more complete study of enemy jungle tactics, reference should be made to the first 12 issues of the *Intelligence Bulletin* (Vol. I), all of which include information on the subject.

2. GENERAL

According to the Japanese, their "reverses" in and around Wau, New Guinea, were caused by insufficient

rations, inexperience in jungle movements, and unfamiliarity with the terrain. Blame for many of the shortcomings in this and other unsuccessful South Pacific campaigns was placed on junior officers and noncommissioned officers.

Discussing the plans of United Nations forces, a Japanese source points out that "everything hostile forces do has a meaning; no matter how small the details, each is a part of a plan. Therefore, it is important that we observe such things at once. If we fail, we will be taken in by the opposing forces."

"When we perceive these details," the Japanese treatise continues, "we must next decide on plans to counter the opposition, and take advantage of weaknesses. . . . If you keep studying your opposition, no matter how small and insignificant the information may appear to be, you will improve your judgment for use during critical moments."

a. Training

Japanese notes on training stipulated that:

- (1) Battle regulations be read until they were memorized by all personnel.
- (2) Officers thoroughly instruct their men on enemy weapons, uniforms, and features (they should at least be able to identify an automatic rifle by its sound).
- (3) The ability of troops to throw hand grenades be improved.
- (4) Training be given in climbing and descending cliffs by means of ropes (this applies particularly to heavy-weapons units).

(5) Further training be given in the transmission of orders. (It is necessary to insure accuracy in this phase of warfare. If circumstances permit, it is best to write out orders before they are transmitted.)

b. Disposal of Booby Traps

The Japanese look for booby traps in areas where United Nations forces expect the former to pass, or in areas the Japs might pass over to avoid booby traps.

If a booby trap is discovered, the Japanese search the area thereabouts for others. The first unit passing through a booby-trapped area should remove the traps, according to enemy instructions.

c. Equipment

A Japanese report on jungle equipment stated that leather shoes should be worn because rubber-soled shoes caused soldiers to slip easily. The report included the following additional points:

- (1) Uniforms should be dark green.
- (2) Each section should be furnished two automatic rifles similar to those used by U. S. forces.
- (3) Each company should have two guns of a type between a grenade thrower and a rifle.
- (4) It is necessary to have field guns (100-mm howitzers, if possible). Hostile field pieces have been very successful, and we have had no really effective answer. If we had field guns with us, the hostile artillery positions could be neutralized.
- (5) Comparatively speaking, our grenade throwers are inferior to those used by United Nations forces.
- (6) There have been times when our hand grenades misfired because they were damp.

d. Care of Wounded

The Japanese "very much regretted" that it was necessary to leave the wounded behind in the Wau operations. "In the future we will give further attention to arrangements for rescuing the wounded. However, if the wounded cannot be rescued, they must be ready to commit suicide at the proper time—that is, after all means to continue the fight have been exhausted.

"In case the wounded are retiring to the rear, always let them carry their small arms and equipment. Their ammunition should be left with comrades at the front. It is regrettable that there have been numerous instances of wounded men abandoning their weapons on the battlefield. Also, there have been instances of men leaving the front line without permission immediately after suffering wounds. This is prohibited."

3. OFFENSE**a. Movement**

During movement in the jungle, Japanese combat forces usually are preceded by a road-repair section, which clears obstacles and takes other possible steps to facilitate travel. In mountainous terrain, this section hangs ropes, erects steps, and constructs guards to prevent troops from slipping.

The force commander usually distributes radios at intervals in the column during the march, to keep himself informed about the situation.

Because the heavy-weapons unit moves more slowly than other units in the column, a Japanese regimental commander suggests that it travel independently in a separate column. In the rugged terrain of the Wau area, the rate of march of an enemy heavy-weapons unit was only about 4 miles per day, alternating 20 minutes of marching with 20 minutes of rest.

The Japanese regimental commander recommends that, during marches in the jungle, bivouacking be done in march formation along the road. However, he adds, the force in the column must shorten its distance to the front. Seldom are there places where the force may assemble together.

The force should go into bivouac 1½ to 2 hours before darkness and should leave about 1 hour after dawn, according to the regimental commander.

To aid their movement at night, a Japanese unit on Bougainville Island marked a trail with vines which had been tipped with phosphorus.

b. Combat Methods

(1) *Launching the Attack.*—The following notes on Japanese combat methods were paraphrased from enemy sources:

In the jungle, dawn and dusk are considered the best times to launch an attack, especially if it is raining. Under such conditions the hostile forces are under tents in trenches, and therefore it is easier for us to approach undetected.

Gaps between hostile positions are comparatively wide (75 to 100 yards), and in many cases they are poorly guarded—some-

times not at all. Therefore getting into these positions is a simple matter.

It is bad tactics to concentrate on, or be diverted to, the front of the hostile forces. It is usually best to employ a small part of your force to make a frontal attack and use your main forces to attack the rear and flanks of the opposition.

When a frontal attack is employed, it is necessary to make thorough preparations. The plan of attack must call for the most effective use of the various heavy weapons and for full use of artillery. Because the terrain is generally wooded and affords a limited field of fire, it is easy to conceal our movements while assault preparations are being made. The depth of hostile defense positions does not exceed 650 yards during the first stages of combat. The curtain of fire at the front of these positions is heavy, but from there to the rear it thins out. Hence it is advisable to make a bold, decisive breakthrough at once.

After launching a frontal attack in a wooded area, it may be advantageous to shift the main force to the rear and flanks of the opposition. This method is particularly good against forces defending a defile along the beaches.

If hostile forces unexpectedly fire on you in the jungles or on grassy plains, do not become excited and return the fire. You must guard particularly against making noises. If you are in position under a unified command, the commanding officer will be prepared to take offensive action against the opposing forces.

You must be continuously on the lookout for hostile observers and snipers, and pick them off with carefully aimed shots. Where their presence is suspected, spray the trees with machine-gun fire.

In New Guinea we used our light machine guns too liberally, and suffered a relatively large number of casualties among the machine gunners. Riflemen should be used to search out the hostile positions, while the light machine guns should be reserved for definite targets.

If our positions are discovered by hostile mortar fire, we must change positions immediately, first retreating about 100 yards.

The power of hostile forces can be effectively reduced by cutting off their supplies—this breaks their fighting spirit. Therefore, at every opportunity, launch surprise attacks in the rear for this purpose.

Our soldiers must rely on their bayonets. U. S. troops depend too much on their fire power and lack the will to fight, both physically and spiritually. Therefore, have confidence in your bayonet, and lunge at your foe. In bayonet drill, practice the straight lunge, with your right foot well forward, so that the bayonet will penetrate all the way to its guard.

(2) *Enemy “Rules” for the Attack.*—The following Japanese combat “rules” were extracted from an enemy manual:

- (a) Take advantage of semidarkness as well as of bad weather.
- (b) If you encounter hostile forces unexpectedly, take the initiative and fire without hesitation.
- (c) If you are in an exposed area of the jungle, find something with which to conceal yourself, instead of dashing around.
- (d) Hold out until the end, because your foe will not rush you. However, be careful of his fire power and hand grenades.
- (e) Always use the assistance of others instead of fighting alone. Make contact with your own troops in every possible way.

(3) *Tactics Observed in Burma.*—Just before certain attacks in the Burma theater, the Japanese reserve forces screamed and yelled. Their forward troops soon joined in the noise-making. Observers said such tactics were obviously designed to break the

morale of the defending forces, to bolster Japanese morale, or to make it appear that the attacking troops were numerically stronger than they actually were.

The Japanese apparently made definite plans to concentrate their attacks in particular sectors, because they continued to press the attacks regardless of casualties or the strength of the opposing forces. Meanwhile, the enemy sent small parties to determine the location of the opposing flanks, with the possible intention of causing United Nations commanders to pull troops from front sectors to strengthen their flanks. Regardless of these maneuvers, the Japanese always concentrated on the attack sector previously selected, and tried to overwhelm the opposition by weight of numbers.

Besides probing fire, the Japanese have used two other methods to tempt United Nations forces to fire and give away their positions:

(a) Japanese soldiers, each equipped with a length of rope, tied the latter to bushes and then moved to a place of safety. Then they worked the rope in an effort to make opposing forces believe that enemy troops were moving among the bushes.

(b) Enemy soldiers employed a simple mechanical device to represent the clicking of rifle bolts. The device in each case was attached to a bush and connected by a rope to a soldier hidden in a place of safety. By manipulating the rope, he made the device sound like the operation of a rifle bolt.

c. Reaction to Ambush

Observers state that, as a general rule, the Japanese in the Burma theater have reacted in the following manner to ambushes:

Leading enemy elements got off the road or trail and sought to outflank the opposing forces. Then the Japanese opened up immediately with mortars (they are seldom without them) and attacked, astride the road or trail, the area in which the ambush was laid.

When ambushed, some Japanese soldiers have been known to fall and feign death.

d. Special Assault Units

In the South Pacific theaters of operation, the Japanese have employed several types of special assault units. In most cases they were not specially trained troops but combined units—or parts of units—selected to accomplish special missions, such as raiding lines of communication or artillery positions.¹ Some of these specially organized units were instructed to withdraw after accomplishing their mission, while others were designated as “suicide units.”

The organization and mission of two of the “suicide units” in New Guinea operations were described in Japanese reports, which are paraphrased below.

One assault unit, commanded by a lieutenant, consisted of an infantry company and a detachment of engineers. This unit was to “advance within close

¹ “How Japanese Raiders Demolish Artillery,” a section based on enemy sources, appeared in *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 4, pp. 13–16.

range of the enemy's main position and attack." The engineers, acting as a demolition detail, were to carry Bangalore torpedoes "to destroy all obstacles and mop up within the positions." Two "suicide raiding units" of six men each were assigned to "penetrate No. 2 and No. 3 enemy positions," and to assist the main assault unit by "throwing the enemy's rear into confusion."

To assist in the operations, a second company was to act as a decoy, while another company was to advance closely behind the assault unit and "leapfrog" the latter at the appropriate time.

The assault unit was organized as follows:

Headquarters, 4 men; Assault Detail, 15 men; Obstacle Detail (1 platoon engrs.); Artillery-demolition Detail, 6 men; Raiding Detail, 7 men; Supporting Detail, 22 men; Reserve Detail, 32 men; Mopping-up Detail, 33 men.

The Assault Detail consisted of four "Grenade Groups," while the Supporting Detail had one light machine-gun squad and one grenade-thrower squad. The Reserve Detail included a rifle squad, a light machine-gun squad, and a grenade-thrower squad.

The second assault unit described by the Japanese, also led by a lieutenant, consisted of infantry and engineer troops. Its mission was to attack a U. S. coastal base from the sea. The enemy order covering the operation included the following:

The strength of the unit will be divided into two sections, combining infantry and engineer troops. There must be close

coordination between the attacks by the infantry and the demolitions carried out by the engineer troops.

Equipment will be as light as possible. In addition to the necessary ammunition, carry as many grenades as you can.

The landing beach will be indicated under a separate order. Your objectives should be ammunition dumps, artillery positions, tanks, enemy headquarters, moored boats, barracks, and so forth.

The boat unit will return as soon as the assault unit has landed.

The attack must be completed before daybreak.

After the attack, the commander of the assault unit will use his own initiative as to whether he will concentrate his forces within the position penetrated or concentrate outside the position. However, he must be situated so that he can support the main regimental attack.²

4. DEFENSE

a. Organization of Positions

(1) *Real.*—Figure 4 is an exact tracing of a Japanese drawing to illustrate the organization of a defensive squad position. This set-up apparently was designed after the “Wau operations” in New Guinea. According to the drawing, emplacements for three to five men are constructed at each point of the triangle (a Japanese rifle squad is approximately the same size as ours). The distance between each group depends on the density of the jungle; however, groups must be within sight of each other. Each group of men is well

² Although the two attacks referred to above took place as planned, both were almost complete failures.

equipped with hand grenades. The squad leader stays in whichever group is most convenient. "It is best," declares a Japanese source, "to connect communication trenches between the two groups. If one of the groups is attacked by hostile forces, the other groups




Figure 4.—Japanese Squad Position (defense).

will attack the rear flanks of these forces. If the latter penetrate to the center of the position, you will use enveloping fire."

(2) *Dummy*.—A Japanese source states that "we have used various devices for constructing dummy positions and personnel, and also for firing from unexpected directions. Everyone should keep planning these day by day."

The enemy apparently is particularly interested in luring U. S. artillery to fire on dummy targets. In this connection, a paraphrased Japanese treatise reads:

Experiments conducted during the fighting at Munda proved that suitably prepared dummy positions and dummy guns were extremely effective in drawing hostile artillery and bombing attacks. In accordance with these results, always try to build dummy gun positions some distance away from our real positions.

Another method of drawing hostile artillery fire is to send out patrols to light fires. The smoke from these will certainly tend to bring down artillery fire on the area. This patrol must be led by an officer because the site must be selected with great care to prevent the hostile fire from reaching real positions.

[NOTE.—Since the Japanese repeatedly give strict warnings against the lighting of fires, smoke columns should be viewed with suspicion.]

A U. S. observer in a Southwest Pacific area described a dummy gun position and several dummy antiaircraft positions. The dummy gun was a coconut-palm log painted gray, with one end hollowed out to represent the muzzle. From a distance of 100 yards it appeared real.

Dummy soldiers were found at the antiaircraft positions. They consisted of tree limbs nailed together, with coconuts used as heads and Japanese uniforms used for clothing. The dummy antiaircraft guns consisted of tree trunks or limbs tied together. A large limb represented the receiver and a smaller one represented the barrel. It is doubtful if these positions would have deceived ground troops at a distance of 200 yards or less.

b. Plans to Counter U. S. Tactics

(1) *Action Against Patrols.*—In New Guinea, Japanese troops were ordered not to answer the searching fire of hostile patrols. “One way to annul their intention (they seek to locate your positions) is to have snipers shoot the patrol,” the order read. “Another method is to hide quietly, remain motionless until the patrol passes, and then knock the hostile troops out with one blow.”

(2) *Action against Ground Attacks.*—The following information on Japanese tactics designed to counter U. S. offensive power is paraphrased from enemy sources:

Hostile attacks in a wooded area will usually begin with automatic rifle fire; the effective range is about 50 yards. Therefore, we can neutralize this fire by clearing a 50-yard area in front of our positions.

In wooded areas there have been instances of hostile forces attacking at close quarters. Troops must not neglect to guard all directions at all times; we cannot always depend on patrols. There have been instances in which patrols were lost in wooded areas and could not report at the proper time. Do not send them out too far; limit their area and give them a specific mission, so that they can be recalled at a suitable time.

While standing guard, do not move your head quickly, otherwise you will often be detected. Make a hole in a big leaf and stand behind it, or construct a cover.

When cool firing is difficult due to heavy hostile automatic-weapons fire, there are many occasions when hand grenades will prove effective in carrying on the fight.

When hostile forces begin to retreat, the men on guard will increase their fire power and will launch a counterattack to destroy the opposition. However, take precautions to see that the men do not lose their way back.

Guards will entice small hostile forces to approach as close as possible and then destroy them. When somewhat larger forces attack, you must commence firing outside of grenade-throwing range (50 yards).

The hostile forces [U. S. troops] do not possess very effective strength in the assault, but they will try to annihilate us by relying on fire power alone; therefore we will be wiped out if we try to defend ourselves while remaining in one place.

When hostile forces attack, we must act quickly in a minimum of time and confuse them by destroying the attacking unit. In using this method, we must preserve our strength instead of displaying it all on the front line. When we attack, the rear flank of the opposition will be the objective.

The hostile forces are skilled in approaching by crawling, and they often get within 15 yards of our troops without being detected. They open surprise fire with very rapid-firing automatic weapons and deal destructive blows. However, they do not charge; their grenade throwers approach and toss grenades or shoot them with grenade rifles. If our positions are held strongly, the opposing forces will retreat after a short time, or they may send combat details around our flanks to attack with grenades and automatic weapons.

In taking countermeasures against such hostile attacks, we must scatter the opposing forces and then carry out a strong assault at one point. It is usually advantageous to attack the hostile flanks with two or three squads. Draw the opposition close by remaining under complete cover. Then, by surprise and accurate fire, kill the light machine-gun operator. However

small your force may be, prepare to fight on all sides, and try to envelop any hostile envelopment by concerted action.

Clear away the underbrush for a distance of 15 yards from your positions; remove no more underbrush than necessary so that the clearing will not be noticeable.

Hostile forces seldom, if ever, attack at night. When they are aware that their positions are known to us, they frequently fire tracer bullets and rifle grenades—this is searching fire intended to make us retaliate and reveal our positions.

At times hostile patrols penetrate to our rear—this generally occurs during the first half of the night.

(3) *Action against Parachutists.*—The following information from Japanese sources was included in an enemy order governing the defense of an airfield against U. S. parachutists:

Hostile parachute units, when attacking airfields while the wind is blowing, will fly in down-wind; bail out against the wind, and descend with the current. The parachutists, as a general rule, will descend after hostile forces have strafed or bombed our defenses.

In defense against such parachutist attacks, site machine-gun and rifle positions around and near the airfield so that these weapons can be fired up and against the wind.

Keeping in mind the rate of descent (16.4 feet per second) and the wind current, sights will be aligned at a point below and down-wind to the parachutists.

The following table gives some examples of how to sight your rifle or machine gun:

| | |
|----------------|-----------------------------|
| 1,640 yds----- | 8 leads down 3 leads right. |
| 1,312 yds----- | 6 leads down 2 leads right. |
| 1,094 yds----- | 3 leads down 2 leads right. |
| 656 yds----- | 3 leads down 1 lead right. |
| 328 yds----- | aim at feet. |

Section II. NOTES ON DEVELOPMENTS IN JAPANESE DEFENSE

1. INTRODUCTION

The following notes deal mainly with how the Japanese conduct defensive warfare on "ordinary" terrain. They do not deal with jungle warfare, although some of the tactics discussed might also be utilized in the jungles.

Except for the fighting on Attu and on certain coral atolls in the Pacific, practically all combat between U. S. ground forces and the Japanese has taken place in jungles. Therefore, to get a more complete picture of enemy operations on "ordinary" terrain, the reader should refer to the following articles previously published in the *Intelligence Bulletin*:

"Defense of Betio Island" (Vol. II, No. 7, pp. 1-35); "Combined Attu Reports on Japanese Warfare" (Vol. II, No. 2, pp. 33-51).

"American Wounded Tell about Japanese on Attu" (Vol. I, No. 12, pp. 48-53); "On the Attu Front" (Vol. I, No. 11, pp. 64-70).

2. ORGANIZATION OF POSITIONS

With regard to Japanese organization and construction of defensive positions, an enemy source is quoted as follows:

Against hostile [U. S.] artillery fire, aerial bombing, and especially against infantry attacks, it is necessary to construct

powerful positions laterally and in depth. The following points must be considered when a strong position is to be constructed:

- a. It must provide for the most effective use of fire power.
- b. It must be strong enough to withstand hostile artillery fire and bombing before we [Japanese] start firing.
- c. It must be capable of being defended independently.
- d. It must be skillfully camouflaged.
- e. It must provide suitable living quarters.
- f. It must have a sufficient supply of ammunition and food, and must have an assured source of water.

Japanese installations for 75-mm guns on Kiska were described by an observer as follows:

"I saw several 75's dug in, about 10 feet deep. To the right and left of each installation were semi-caves which served for living quarters and for storage of ammunition. It was impossible to see these gun emplacements except at close range. Their tops were covered with strong wire, on top of which were a layer of gunny sacks and a layer of tundra. There were no tracks around the emplacements."

In contrast to Betio, the Japanese defense installations on Makin covered only a portion of the island, and most of the positions had no cover. The enemy utilized more barbed wire and individual rifle pits on Makin than on Betio. Figure 5 is a view of a typical rifle pit, reinforced with coconut logs.

The rifle pits, which generally were close together, were almost invariably associated with machine-gun positions. For example, on the western side of the main defense area, the Japanese had 50 rifle pits, 6 machine-gun emplacements, 1 antitank-gun emplace-

ment, and 1 concrete pillbox. Communication trenches frequently connected these installations.

Figure 6 is a typical machine-gun position as found on Makin. Made of earth revetted with vertical coconut logs, this position faces the ocean.




Figure 5.—Typical Japanese Rifle Pit (Makin).

Construction details of the Japanese 37-mm anti-tank-gun emplacement are shown in figure 7. The double side walls are made of logs and filled in between by sand or earth. The front part of the

emplacement is made of thick reinforced concrete. (The same type of emplacement is used for the Japanese 70-mm battalion howitzer.)



Figure 6.—Typical Japanese Machine-gun Position.

3. DEFENSE OF BEACHES

a. General

Observers of three recent landing operations in the Pacific report that the Japanese constructed a large number of alternate rifle and gun emplacements, and that most of these positions were connected by communication trenches. On Betio it was believed that

in several instances firing positions were manned by single riflemen. One observer stated that since rifle pits and gun emplacements are guides in the estimation of enemy strength, this practice of the Japanese should be especially noted.




Figure 7.—Japanese Antitank-gun Emplacement (Makin).

According to an enemy source, one Japanese unit assigned to defend a beach was instructed to distribute drums of gasoline along the beach, and, in case of an invasion, to empty them on the surface of the sea and set the gasoline afire.

b. On Kiska

Almost all the beaches on Kiska had defense installations, which included barbed wire and mines. The island's strategic mid-section beaches that permitted access to the built-up areas around Kiska Harbor and Gertrude Cove were strongly defended.

In general, all beaches accessible to landing craft were mined; breaks in the line of bluffs overlooking the beaches had concealed antitank traps. Well-camouflaged machine-gun dugouts and rifle pits were located on high ground at the extremities of each beach. In the hills behind the beaches, other covered machine-gun emplacements and trench systems, with numerous firing bays, commanded all possible entrances to the interior along valley routes. At a few of the strategic coves, single 75-mm and 37-mm artillery pieces were established in covered emplacements that commanded both the beach landing points and their water approaches. In the more thickly settled areas, the shore line was honeycombed with dug-in machine-gun emplacements, and, in a few cases, the defenses were bolstered by reinforced concrete pillboxes.

Barbed-wire defenses on Kiska consisted of four types:

- (1) Double apron (2½ to 3 feet high at the center and 10 feet wide).
- (2) Four-strand fence (2½ to 3 feet high; criss-crossed strands).
- (3) Low entanglements (1 to 1½ feet high; designed merely to stall advancing troops momentarily).
- (4) Specially designed entanglements.

Double-apron wire was predominant, and was used principally to block the mouths of stream valleys, which at most beaches provide entrance to the interior. Usually, this wire was found strung along the

slopes of grassy dunes just inland from the beach. In only a few cases was the wire established on the beach itself.

Four-strand fence defenses were cleverly located at the crests of steep beach bluffs, where the barbs would retard the attacking soldier after his energy would have been spent in climbing. Heavy machine-gun positions usually commanded the full length of these barriers.

Low entanglements were stretched upon pegs just off the gray rocks of a few of the lesser beaches. In most cases the wire blended well with the rocks, and was hard to see except at close range.

At Reynard Cove the Japanese set up a unique wire entanglement. Barbed strands were strung from the top of the 15-foot bluff behind the beach to pegs driven into the beach, creating a thorny maze through which U. S. troops would have had to climb in order to reach the high ground behind the bluff.

The barbed-wire defenses on Kiska were not erected in depth, and probably in most cases would not have been difficult to penetrate. Except at one beach where two fences existed, no more than one wire barrier stood between the sea and the island's interior. At many of the beaches unused coils of barbed wire were found in storage piles, indicating that the Japanese had planned to erect additional wire defenses.

To prevent U. S. planes from flying up a ravine leading from a west beach on Kiska to a target in the

interior, the Japanese stretched steel cables across the deep, narrow valley. Under similar conditions, the enemy may be expected to employ such methods in future operations.

c. On Bougainville

Instructions given by the Japanese headquarters on Bougainville for repelling the expected United Nations landings are paraphrased below.

(1) At all probable landing points, small forces will be posted as security units, and the main force will be ready to go into action at a moment's notice.

(2) You will reconnoiter the enemy situation from as great a distance as feasible, and devise some means of discovering their intentions. In this connection, make suitable use of natives; establish a network of sea lookouts by use of small boats; post lookouts on each small island; establish sea lookout stations on hills overlooking the sea; maintain close liaison among lookout stations.

The enemy's landing points will be localized, and the hostile forces will be tricked into landing in areas where we have already formulated plans of attack. To this end, in sectors where we want to dissuade hostile forces from landing, construct dummy positions, dummy barracks, and dummy lookout stations.

4. DEFENSE AGAINST TANKS¹

The Japanese, as has been pointed out in previous issues of the *Intelligence Bulletin*, put unusual stress

¹ In connection with this section, reference should be made to "Antitank Tactics" (*Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 2, p. 56) and to "Tactics against Tanks" (*Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 6, pp. 16-19).

on close-quarter attacks against tanks by individuals or small groups, known as "tank fighters." These groups in most cases consist of two or three men.

Weapons believed to be used by the "tank fighters" include armor-piercing magnetic mines, mines tied with grenades, clusters of grenades, Molotov cocktails, and pole mines (mines attached to the ends of poles).

The three-man group, according to enemy sources, usually operates as follows:

No. 1 hurls a Molotov cocktail at a tank, and, if the weapon hits the target, he yells "a hit." In that case, the others do not attack the target. If the throw is unsuccessful, No. 1 will yell "a miss." In this case, the group leader will immediately attack the tank with a pole mine in an effort to damage the tracks and thus stop the tank.

No. 2, before explosion of the pole mine, seeks to damage the tank's guns by placing under them an adhesive mine or similar explosive. It is considered preferable for No. 2 to attack the tank simultaneously with the leader if No. 2 is carrying an armor-piercing mine.

The two-man group, according to Japanese sources, usually operate as follows:

The leader carries a pole mine, and No. 1 carries a Molotov cocktail. Once the tank has apparently chosen a direction of movement, or has been forced by terrain into a definite channel, the attack is made, preferably from both sides simultaneously.

To combat tanks on a larger scale, the Japanese have devised what they call an "elastic defense," which operates as follows:

At the approach of a tank attack in force, only some 20 percent of available heavy infantry weapons are used from front-line positions. With the exception of one squad per platoon, all units fall back 800 to 1,500 yards. The squads remaining on the front lines scatter, lay a smoke screen, and attack the tanks with incendiary grenades as they come through the smoke.

While the tanks are meeting this resistance, they come under the fire of all the main Japanese antitank weapons, which are sited 500 to 800 yards to the rear. Meanwhile the divisional artillery moves forward to positions which permit direct firing on the tanks, thus supporting the infantry either in defense or in a counterattack.

Japanese sources state that once a tank attack is stopped by this "elastic defense" method, the hostile forces are pinched off, and that the infantry, although scattered, can still offer successful opposition to hostile infantry which might attempt to exploit the advance of tanks.

Section III. TWO BOOBY TRAPS DEvised BY JAPANESE

1. INTRODUCTION

Although the Japanese have actually used only a comparatively few booby traps to date, they are known to have devised several types of these weapons, principally by rigging up fragmentation grenades in various ways. The enemy is known to have at least five types of such grenades, all of which can be adapted for booby-trapping purposes. Japanese mines and artillery shells also have been improvised for use as booby traps.

For information on Japanese booby traps which previously has been carried in the *Intelligence Bulletin*, reference should be made to the following issues:

“Land Mines, Grenades, and Booby Traps” (Vol. II, No. 1, pp. 1-15); “New Japanese Weapons” (Vol. II, No. 3, pp. 39-48); “Supplementary Notes on Booby Traps and Mines” (Vol. II, No. 4, pp. 21-26).

This section deals with the Japanese tube booby trap and string booby trap, details of which come from enemy sources. The tube type seems to be a Japanese favorite.

2. DETAILS OF TUBE TYPE

a. Construction

The tube itself is made of steel, iron, bamboo, or any other suitable material (see fig. 8). It is about 15 inches long, with a diameter large enough to admit a grenade (the Japanese Model 91 hand grenade is shown in the diagram). Three holes are drilled through the tube to accommodate the suspension wire (1), the safety wire (2), and the support wire (3).

The grenade is placed in the tube, as shown in the diagram. The base of the tube is closed by use of a stone or a piece of iron, while the upper opening is covered with similar material as a protection against rain. To complete the rigging process, the tube is strapped to a stake which is driven in the ground.

b. Operation

The support wire (3), which holds the grenade in place during the assembling process, and the safety wire (2) are removed at the same time. The grenade is now held in place by the suspension wire (1). When this wire is removed the grenade falls down the tube and, upon hitting the hard base, the firing pin is forced into the cap. This causes the detonation of the grenade in about 4 to 8 seconds. Another function of the iron or stone plug at the base of the tube is to protect the grenade against rain.

c. Ways of Rigging

(1) *Spring Method*.—A cross wire at a height of about 1 foot is used (see fig. 9). Attached to the cross




Figure 8.—Japanese Tube Booby Trap.




Figure 9.—Japanese Tube Booby Trap (utilizing spring method).

wire is another wire, which is also attached to the suspension wire. When the cross wire is pulled, it will extract the suspension wire (1). To allow for the movement of the cross wire, a spring is attached to the end of the cross wire which is opposite to the direction of the pull. The same principle is used when it is necessary to set a booby trap around a corner or a curve. The only change is that a bent nail is used as a pulley.

(2) *Weight Method*.—The spring used in the spring method is substituted by a weight, which allows for two directions of movement (see fig. 10). When the cross wire is pulled the weight is lifted, thus causing one movement, and, when the cross wire is cut or




Figure 10.—Japanese Tube Booby Trap (utilizing weight method).

loosened, the weight falls to the ground and causes a movement in the opposite direction. Either movement will withdraw the suspension wire.

(3) *Stake Method*.—In this method a stake or limb which has elasticity and weight is used (see fig. 11). The tree or stake is placed in such a manner that the cross wire holds it in position. When the cross wire is pulled, the elasticity of the tree permits sufficient movement to the cross wire to extract the suspension wire. If the cross wire is cut or freed at the end opposite to that attached to the tree, the latter will fall to the ground and pull out the suspension wire.

3. DETAILS OF STRING TYPE

To rig up the Japanese string-type booby trap, two trees adjacent to each other are selected. A hole is drilled through the trunks of each tree, and a length of easily broken string is passed through the holes




Figure 11.—Japanese Tube Booby Trap (utilizing elastic stake method).

(see fig. 12). On each end of the string is attached a grenade whose safety wire has been removed. Tied into the string between the grenade and the tree are three nails. When that portion of the string which is suspended between the trees is pulled, the nails prevent the movement of the string. Therefore, if the force is great enough, it will break. This frees the grenades and they fall to the ground, striking a rock, steel plate, or any other hard surface previously placed there. The firing pin is forced into the cap; this action detonates the grenade.




Figure 12.—Japanese String Booby Trap.

Section IV. JAPANESE CHARACTERISTICS AND REACTION IN BATTLE

1. INTRODUCTION

Characteristics of Japanese soldiers and their reactions under fire have been discussed frequently in the *Intelligence Bulletin*, primarily for the purpose of acquainting U. S. junior officers and enlisted men with the enemy they may face in battle. Repetition has largely been avoided in presenting this information; therefore, for a fairly complete study of the subject matter, the reader should refer to the following articles in past issues of the bulletin:

Vol. I—"Characteristics of the Japanese" (No. 2, pp. 27-35; this section tells how to differentiate between the Japanese and the Chinese); "The Japanese Soldier" (No. 3, pp. 35-36); "Festivals and Holidays" (No. 3, pp. 53-54); "Individual Characteristics" (No. 5, p. 37); "The Individual Soldier" (No. 5, pp. 42-52); "Handling Personnel" (No. 6, pp. 9-11); "Enemy Thoughts" (No. 6, pp. 18-26); "Morale" (No. 7, pp. 27-28); "Regarding Morale" (No. 8, pp. 55-57); "The Japanese Soldier" (No. 9, pp. 1-4); "Comments by Prisoners" (No. 9, pp. 27-29); "Conduct of Soldiers" (No. 10, pp. 80-81). Vol. II—"Individual Characteristics" (No. 2, pp. 33-34), and "Morale, Characteristics of Japanese Soldier" (No. 3, pp. 66-69).

2. AS SEEN BY OBSERVERS

Summing up the characteristics of the individual Japanese soldier during the New Georgia operations, a U. S. intelligence officer described the enemy as follows:

"He was afraid of hand-to-hand combat, and ran when our troops got close, unless he was in a well-concealed foxhole or in a fortified position. His marksmanship was poor—we were usually safe at a distance of 50 or more yards. However, he was expert at camouflage, and was thoroughly trained to operate in the jungle. He obeyed orders very well, and proved himself capable in night attacks and in handling barge movements. His officers lied to him frequently to bolster his morale. Not one Jap in 100 could speak any English. . . ."

A U. S. participant in the fighting around Buna described the average Japanese as follows:

"He had definite characteristics. We found that he was not too willing to die when the odds were against him, and that he squealed like a pig when routed. He was crafty, and took full advantage of his surroundings to improve his position. His camouflage was excellent. He frequently climbed trees and waited several hours for a target. He used decoys to draw our fire, with the intention of discovering our positions. He delighted in pulling various ruses to bewilder inexperienced troops. He fought with dogged determination while he considered he had a chance to win."

An observer in the South Pacific relates that the regimental colors and standards of active infantry and cavalry regiments of the Japanese Army are highly revered, and guarded above the life of any member of the particular regiment. He says that the extreme importance attached to the regimental flag is borne out by statements made by prisoners of war. One prisoner said that a colonel in command of an infantry regiment was rescued from a torpedoed ship but that his regimental colors and the color bearer had gone down with the ship. As a result, the colonel, according to the prisoner, became mentally unbalanced and continually referred to the loss of the colors while apparently being indifferent to the loss of men and equipment.

The regimental colors of the infantry and cavalry regiments are presented to the units by the emperor and are symbolic of the "divine" Imperial family. The colors are never replaced, and their loss is considered by the Japanese to be an everlasting disgrace. An officer, usually a 2nd lieutenant, is selected to carry and guard the colors. It is stated that he undoubtedly would be executed if the colors were captured.

The regimental colors of old regiments of the Japanese Army are now little more than a few shreds of cloth and tassels, and are the more highly prized on this account.

The colors consist of the Imperial flag of Japan on a pole, which is capped by the Imperial Crest, a chrys-

anthemum. The Imperial flag consists of a red sun with red rays on a white background.

3. ACCORDING TO JAPANESE SOURCES

That Japanese soldiers have been indoctrinated with the idea they are "sons of heaven" is borne out by the following statement made by an enemy soldier:

The first time the natives of the Gilbert Islands saw Japanese planes and soldiers was shortly after the outbreak of the war. They were astonished at the short stature of our air force personnel.

When the native saw the noble sight of our defense forces repulsing American attempts to land and our air force covering the skies, their confidence turned to worship. They then believed in the legend of "A land of the gods across the sea." Now that the natives have seen our god-soldiers, they have come forth as partisans of the Imperial Forces.

At least one Japanese unit was given the following "Guide to Certain Victory":

Fight hard; leaving nothing undone. If you are afraid of dying, you will die in battle; if you are not afraid, you will not die; if you are thinking of going back home, you will never go; if you do not think of it, you will go home.

A Japanese soldier made the following optimistic statement:

When we think about going to Sydney [Australia] and Washington, D. C., our morale soars.

Man for man, we ought not to be beaten by those hairy foreigners. We must foster such conviction and skill that one of our men can take on, if not 1,000, then at least 10 of theirs!

Further insight into the cocky, bragging nature of the Japanese soldier—as long as he is winning—is revealed in the following enemy poem:

We will have the rising sun dyed with a red tide of blood as a symbol of world domination.

We will angle for crocodiles in the Himalaya-bestowed waters of the Ganges [river in India].

We will have our annual Boys' Festival in London when the fog clears.

The lights of London and [illegible] will shine again when our police take over there.

Today in Berlin, tomorrow in Moscow.

Even snow-swept Siberia will be in the August Hands of the Emperor.

Our grandchildren will erect memorials to us in the streets of Chicago.

We will drink our fill of *sake* on the plains overlooked by great mountains.

[Line regarding the Great Wall of China and the Gobi desert unprintable—Translator]

If I die, let it be where the three rivers meet, and there will I wrestle with my thoughts.

When Japanese casualties began to mount in a certain South Pacific combat area, the enemy command deemed it necessary to revise the procedure of burying the dead, and issued the following instructions:

Too many graves with markers are not good for security and morale. Also, it is unfair to erect grave markers for some persons and not for others. Since a grave will be erected at the home of a deceased man, it is not necessary to erect one for him on the battlefield.

When burying the dead on the battlefield, avoid using the sides of a road. To dig a grave for a deceased person near the road may be taken as a sign of disrespect for him. In burying the dead away from the road, dig as deep as possible so that the offensive odor will not leak out.

Previously reported Japanese doctrine with regard to becoming prisoners of war is confirmed by the following enemy statement:

Under no circumstances become a straggler or a prisoner of war. In case you become helpless, commit suicide nobly.

Section V. JAPANESE PLAN TO COUNTER SUPERIOR FIRE POWER

1. INTRODUCTION

In several areas of the South Pacific, the Japanese have made reference to the "superior fire power" of the United States and Australian forces. At least one large enemy unit has devised a written plan "to counter hostile forces equipped with superior fire power." The salient points of this plan are presented below.

2. THE PLAN

a. Preparations

When faced with superior fire power, it is essential that we [the Japanese] select the terrain for combat, as well as the time for launching the attack, and take the hostile forces by surprise. We should select terrain that provides good concealment, such as wooded areas.

We must make a thorough reconnaissance of the dispositions and intentions of the hostile forces, and we must thoroughly familiarize ourselves with the terrain selected for combat. Furthermore, we should study the habitual strategy of the hostile forces, and prepare ourselves to take advantage of their weak points.

Our plans must be kept secret, including our reconnaissances, and we must attack at an unexpected time and at unexpected places. We seldom will be able to gain surprise by attacking the opposing forces on terrain which permits a fairly easy ap-

proach. Stormy or foggy nights afford good opportunities to attack with surprise. The attack must be made with as much mobility as possible.

To minimize damage from superior fire power, we must use camouflage effectively and prevent our forces from bunching. And when the fighting becomes static, we must utilize well-constructed positions, the natural protection afforded by the terrain, and dummy positions. We can deceive the hostile forces by using dummy soldiers, dummy observation towers, and so forth. The positions for automatic weapons must be changed frequently, and positions for heavy weapons must be well concealed.

b. Use of Weapons

In the employment of our weapons, we must carefully select targets, and then concentrate on them to gain local fire superiority. For example, three riflemen should constitute a group to concentrate on one particular target. Likewise, two light machine guns may profitably be concentrated on one target. Be sure to take every advantage of the mobility of these weapons.

As for grenade dischargers, we should attack suddenly with them toward the most important target. Do not deliver ranging fire, but fire for effect immediately after going into position.

When on the defensive under normal conditions, the company commander and, if possible, the platoon or squad leaders will concentrate their fire power on the main objective. After annihilating the latter, they should move on to a new objective.

Before launching an assault, the commander of a rifle company should organize an assault platoon. He should coach his men on the need for concentrating fire power, and the necessity for carefully utilizing it during the assault.

With regard to the machine-gun company and the infantry battalion-gun company, each commander should order individual squads to fire rapidly in short bursts. Forward movements should be made by advancing in echelon or by moving from position to position in line or abreast.

Section VI. SOME JAP METHODS OF OVERCOMING OBSTACLES

1. INTRODUCTION

The following information on Japanese methods of overcoming obstacles was extracted from an enemy publication dealing with field fortifications. A study of these methods should prove helpful to U. S. military personnel concerned with the defense of obstacles against Japanese attacks. However, these methods should not necessarily be construed as complete and up-to-date enemy tactical doctrine on the subject.

In connection with this section, reference should be made to "Notes on How Japanese Attack Pillboxes" (*Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. I, No. 12, pp. 54-60).

2. WIRE OBSTACLES

In determining where a breach will be made in a hostile wire obstacle, select a section which will facilitate the operations, provided the selection will fit in with the over-all tactical plan. Generally speaking, select portions of wire obstacles which have been damaged by shells or bombs, or are easily approached.

The organization and equipment of demolition parties vary according to the particular situation. Personnel include the

party commander, operators, and relief men, who constitute a reserve and act as sentinels. The equipment includes wire cutters, Bangalore torpedoes, hand grenades, smoke pots, and, depending on the situation, portable shields, sandbags, and so forth.

a. Operating with Secrecy

To make a breach in a hostile [U. S.] wire obstacle secretly, the demolition party must be thoroughly rehearsed beforehand in all details.

In cutting wires, first investigate the presence or absence of thin wire, the condition of intersecting wires, the presence or absence of alarm installations, and so forth. Then open wide the handles of the wire cutter, raise the catch claw (a stick in a piece of bamboo), and, after slowly inserting the wire cutter all the way at a right angle about 1 foot from a post, press the handles with both hands and make a notch in the wire. Grasp the notched wire with both hands, one on either side of the notch, and hold the long strand fast; without making any noise, bend and break the short strand. Bend the end of the short strand close to the post in the direction of the opposing forces, and immediately thereafter stick the end of the long strand into the ground as far as possible from its point of attachment, or tie it to some natural object.

When two men operate jointly, one man (A) holds both sides at the cutting point, and the other (B) makes the notch. (A) breaks the wire, following the principles outlined above, and (A) takes care of the long strand and (B) the short strand.

While cutting wire, the operator must rest one elbow against his body, on the ground, or on a post. In cutting the lower strands, he will kneel or lie down; he will assume any convenient posture while cutting the higher strands.

In placing Bangalore torpedoes under wire obstacles, two men are employed. After the rear man has removed the safety catch and screwed in the igniter, and the front man has ascertained

the spot where the torpedo will be placed, the two operators push the weapon on the ground to its final position. Sometimes a torpedo is placed in position by use of pulleys.

In igniting Bangalore torpedoes, the rear operator pulls the string with a sharp jerk and, within the delay time, withdraws 10 or more yards to the rear and lies down. To avoid any danger, all personnel take full advantage of terrain or natural objects which afford protection.

In case a Bangalore torpedo fails to explode, the demolition party should have a torpedo in reserve, or be prepared to use wire cutters.

Should the demolition party be illuminated by hostile search-lights or receive fire, it must try to maintain as much secrecy as possible and continue its work with perseverance and fortitude.

When the demolition is completed, the party commander reports by means of previously arranged signals and fixes the necessary markers. He also acts as an observer and watches at the breach.

b. Operating under Fire

To succeed in cutting a breach in a wire obstacle while under fire, the demolition party must work with speed, decisiveness, and daring. It must take advantage of all opportunities to neutralize or impair hostile fire by means of our own fire power or smoke.

In cutting the wire, open wide the handles of the wire cutter, put yourself in a position to support the left (right) elbow, and cut so as to push the wire with the right (left) hand; cut straight through at right angles. The point of cutting should be as near a post as possible.

In placing Bangalore torpedoes under wire obstacles, one man forward generally keeps the head end of the torpedo at the selected post, and two rear men insert the weapon with one shove. Sometimes, depending on the situation, it is advisable to place the torpedo on top of the wire and ignite it.

In disposing of steel wire nets, whether secretly or while under fire, the demolition party should either cover them, clear them away, or destroy them with Bangalore torpedoes. If necessary, have troops lie temporarily on top of the wire net and press it down.

3. ABATIS

In using the implements to overcome abatis secretly, open a passage, if possible, by cutting off the branches close to the surface of the ground and slowly clearing them away to an adequate extent, with all personnel cooperating.

In making a breach in abatis while under fire, first cut any wires, then cut the branches and remove them to one side. Sometimes it may be better to dig the abatis from their foundations and clear the branches away. Those not firmly secured can often be cleared away by attaching a net to them and pulling.

To destroy abatis by means of Bangalore torpedoes, rest the pipe on the forked part of the branches on the front edge. Remember that simple abatis are often combined with hand grenades, and land mines, and so forth. Demolition or removal in such cases will be carried out after first disarming the weapons.

4. ANTITANK OBSTACLES

To enable passage of tanks over an antitank ditch, blast down the sides of the ditch with explosives, or tear down the slopes with implements, or fill the ditch with sandbags and other suitable material, or set up a gabion or framework.¹

¹ A gabion is a cylindrical basket woven with open ends; it is filled with earth and generally used as a retaining wall in constructing fieldworks. In modern warfare sandbags are generally used in place of gabions.

To destroy iron-rail barriers and abatis, explode grouped demolition charges or Bangalore torpedoes at the base of the obstacles, or clear them away by use of suitable implements.

To enable tanks to cross an antitank pit, lay logs over the top at right angles to the direction the tanks will travel; or place gabions, and so forth inside the pit. In laying logs, be sure that they are firmly placed to prevent slipping. The interval between logs varies with the type of tank. For medium tanks the interval should be not more than $1\frac{1}{2}$ yards; for light armored cars it should be not more than $2\frac{1}{2}$ feet. In putting a gabion inside the pit, it is necessary to consider the distance it will sink by the weight of the tanks. If frames are used, all parts should be connected by wires, or iron fasteners. It will be advantageous to carry along several types of frames, prepared so that we can place them simply and quickly, as desired.

Section VII. MISCELLANEOUS

1. HANDLING PRISONERS

That at least some high Japanese officers recognize the importance of capturing prisoners for intelligence purposes is borne out by the following enemy statements:

Since prisoners often furnish profitable intelligence, after you have examined them as to their unit, you will send them back immediately to higher headquarters. This procedure is doubly imperative when an important enemy officer is captured.

Interrogating intelligent prisoners of war is a profitable manner in which to accumulate information.

If we make a special effort, we can capture prisoners with ease. Therefore, all front-line units, sentries, and patrols will take advantage of opportunities to execute surprise attacks for this purpose. You will find it profitable to use pitfalls.

2. USE OF ENGINEERS

The Japanese Army engineer is very much a front-line soldier. He is employed in the advance guard during an approach; he is used in the first waves of troops during landing operations; or he is detailed to any job which requires special training, such as special

assault detachments or parties for attacking strongly fortified positions, for attacking tanks at close range, and for raiding hostile artillery positions, and so forth.

It is interesting to note the percentage of engineers the Japanese use in assault groups. In fighting tanks or attacking pillboxes, the enemy party may be composed entirely of engineer troops. From 50 to 75 percent of the personnel in raiding parties are engineers.

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(For explanation of symbols see FM 21-6.)



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